BOOK VIII

Okay, so I'm a little less than half way through book 8 and I had something short of a revelation. While reading about Friendship, specifically what Aristotle claims as high order friendship, that relating to the "Good" or the "Friendship of the Good" I came across the following line that struck me.

"The Friendship of the good is also the only kind that is immune to slanders; for it is not easy to give credence to anyone about a person one has scrutinized oneself over a long period; also trust exists between them, and the thought that 'he would never have treated me unjustly', and all the other features that one expects of a friendship that is truly friendship."

When I read this line, the first time that came to my mind was the dynamic tragedy between Julius Caesar and Brutus, specifically, the Shakespearean version of the history and that climatic line, "Et tu Brtute?" before this death. Truly, this fall, this betrayal of that perfect, trusting friendship so elegantly played out by Shakespeare, is the ultimate fear, the ultimate loss. To be murdered is one thing unto itself, but to be murdered and to see one's closest friend, the person that one thinks "would never have treated me unjustly" holding the blade delivering the final blow, well, after seeing that, the emotion that follows would, I am sure, the welcoming of death, the desire to no longer live in a world where that friendship of the good becomes one of betrayal, why, for that person, that Caesar in both the real and metaphorical sense, Death would become the ONLY "true" friend. Death, welcoming, fair, just, and universal. Death cannot be unjust. But I border on Nihilism here.... What is the connection to ethics? The connection, I believe, is thus: That even knowing that no matter how well one knows someone, how long the friendship has lasted, how "scrutinized" the person has been, the motives of the friend can always change, and so there are two options: Isolation, paranoia, and loneiless, or trust, faith, and fellowship; friendship. It is transcending the fears, the suspicions, and possibility for betrayal, to live a life of love and virtue, ergo, happiness. As for Brutus, he realized this too late, "Which one of us did not strike for justice's sake?" He asks, realizing that no one struck for justice's sake but him, he stood alone in that he placed this ideal, this concept, this "society" before his friendship, and, alas he ate coal, unable to live with the guilt. Indeed, Brutus, poor, treacherous Brutus, lacked Phronesis, lacked virtue, lacked friendship to the end.

This example, of course, is using Shakespeare's play, which some historians dispute, and yet no "history" has evoked this emotion in me. So perhaps, those who claim that history is not history of, but history for (i.e. Hayden White, Claude Levi-Strauss) are correct, that history must take a narrative form, always, because the "historian" has only events to deal with, and in recording these events and making necessary connections, he sub-consciously imposes a bias. Now, in relation to ethics, this has me thinking, what if ethics take a narrative form as well? What if people decide to or not to be virtuous is because they "enjoy other's bad qualities" or because of the search for the good and long living friendships, as Aristotle puts forth, but simply because of the signifiers one picks up as a youth, in accordance with the system, the structural way in which he sees the world? And until that structure changes (indeed even those who support "structuralism" debated whether it could consciously change) to align oneself with the virtuous through deliberate action (of course, requiring phronesis) one will not be able to seek out those "good" friends? I noticed other connections in Aristotle's writing as well, for example, Binary Opposition: He lays out that people will seek friendships where one needs something from the other, he gives the example of Rich man/poor man, lover/beloved, beautiful and ugly, Father/Son and different "systems" or structures to categorize the world: "Timocracy" ""Tyranny" "Kingship" "Aristocracy". Aristotle, indeed, is already ordaining the way people act and relate to others in structured ways. Now, that Friendship should be a give-and-take, whereby I do something and then receive a favor, is an odd view for me to comprehend... indeed, perhaps Aristotle has set up too much "Structure", although in a different sense.... So I would argue that for Aristotle the "Vicious" person simply hasn't garnered Phronesis - he is immature, foolish, irrdeliberate, BUT, there is room for redemption. It is, for Aristotle, a choice, a choice that one might not want to make at first or be aware of, but he can change his ways. The Virtuous person, by contrast, is the person who not only has made the choice but transcends the choice - he acts in a manner of excellence, without trying to or without expecting anything in return. In this case, at least limited to the act of virtues and friendship, he steps out of (or into, by choice) those structures Aristotle identified, in order to become a better, happier and more fulfilled person. At any rate, I will now consider Doris:

Doris doesn't exact believe that Generosity implies that one is compassionate, as an example, in the same sense that Aristotle, as I gather, feels that if one practises generosity, they become more compassionate. She notes that behaviour isn't linked to a specific personality trait in studies - it all revolves around the specific situation, and normally outside influences as well (she gives the example of a coin in the phone both making people much more likely to help a person coming out of that phone booth gather his/her belongings). Thus patterns of behaviour are entirely situational, not based on developing traits. So for her, things outside the structure, for a post-structuralist, "the Other", cannot help but affect the decisions that one makes. Perhaps I should help the woman who fell outside the phone booth - Phronesis tells me this is the virtuous thing to do, but then I will miss my bus, which will make me late to my Ethics Final, and thereby cause me to fail the class. Subjectively, I know that no matter how virtuous my actions, making that bus is more important, regardless of being virtuous. Now, If I did not have the stipulation of missing the bus, I would, of course help her, but, forces outside my control in one situation will affect the outcome, forces absent in another situation. So I think that her point is that there is no way of developing these traits and actions, because people act in accordance to the situations, and, in at least some of these, the use of phronesis cannot be the only way to determine the correct course of action. So to her, deliberation is important as well, but it is not deliberation over character as so much as it is deliberation over how to amend the situations that one finds oneself in. Thus one should reflect on the situations one may find oneself in before attending those situations, as Doris points out in the example between a married person and his flirtatious co-worker inviting him/her over when the spouse is away. While one can rely on character once in the situation, it is better to avoid it all together, Doris states. Although to me, it still requires a firm character, and, indeed, phronesis, to decide not to go at all. So I do believe this needs to be specified more (the difference between Character/Situation) before I can fully grasp it. For this reason, I suppose the Virtuous person would be the one who stays home and thus avoids the possibility of an ethical lapse, and the vicious one, acknowledging this, goes anyway, and trusts his own traits and character too much. Again, I cannot tell how Aristotle would respond and that makes this difficult to comment on. I do feel, however, that both have in mind an ideal, the ideal man, ideal way to act, etc. and that we should ascribe to achieving that ideal. The difference is the (most practical?) method used to achieve that ideal.