So in this reading, Hume distgunishes between natural and artifical virtues. As aforementioned, the idea of Justice is an artifical virtue. Hume believes this because in certain instances, when universally applied, justice can wrongfully cause a person pain. However, overall, it is an invention that men need in order to live together in society. So for Hume, a natural virtue would be something that is a direct result of our mind or sympathy in particular. Generally speaking the idea of justice is too far detached from our own perceptions to be considered "natural". He also stresses the importance of pride, saying that it is key to the "heroic virtues".
I had a problem with a paragraph where Hume does speak about logic, and strings together several seemingly contradictory ideas:
"The nessacary consquence of there principals is, that pride, or an overweaning conciet of others, must be vicious; since it causes uneasiness in all men.... tis our own pride which makes us so displeased of the pride of others.... but the proud can never endure the proud." (3.3.2.7)
I'm not sure what to make of all this here....
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Hume, Third Reading
Hume, using his belief that reason simply is a tool that asses the validity of our goals and tries to achieve them, makes the case in this reading that many beliefs humans hold (Justice, Property, Virtues, etc.) are simply weighted as good because they benefit or excite our passions. In this regard, his empiricist bent is clearly showing.
3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from reason-
Perceptions are the core way that ideas are acknowledged by the mind - this includes the passions. Moral good and evil only have value when viewed in relation to other objects. Good, Evil, Virtue and Vice are a posteri, as opposed to a priori, values. In other words, we learn these values after we have lived in the world - they are not universal truths.
3.1.2 Moral Distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense-
If an impression arises that we view as agreeable, or pleasant, it is considered a virtue; If an impression arises that is unfavorable or painful, it is a vice. Nature cannot account for what makes something virtuous or vicious, they are on a level playing field. That which most benefits or creates pleasure becomes a virtue, since this is derived from passions, it is an "artificial" view.
3.2.1 Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?-
Justice is an artificial virtue because it was created by humans as a means to encourage living together in societies and to control this aspect of life around the time that civilization developed. So it is morally good because human nature provided the motive for the establishment of justice.
3.2.2 Of the Origin of Justice and Property-
The relationship between men and their property is moral, not natural, and is based on justice. It is in public interest that we follow the laws of justice in relation to objects and property. Since we have a need for these rules and codes of conduct, it becomes apparent that there is nothing natural about them, or else we wouldn't need them in the first place.
3.3.3 Of the rules, which determine property-
Property is not a natural thing. The relationship between a person and his/her property is purely mental, it is an aspect of the imagination. The idea of property arose around the time of civilization.
3.3.4 Of the transference of property by consent-
The first person to claim/create a piece of property/object becomes the owner of it. The object can only be transferred via occupation, prescription, accession, or succession. Again, these are all artificial and imaginary, rather than absolute, rules. It is a symbolic transfer when this happens.
3.3.5 Of the Obligation of Promises-
A promise is an unnatural change in the obligation of person and his sentiments. Promises are necessary inventions created to help smoothen human relations in societies. This does not, however, mean that there is not moral obligation to fulfill them,
3.3.6 Some further reflections concerning justice and injustice-
The classical interpretation of law is that certain things are eternal, natural, and absolute, Hume argues that this is not the case, they are indeed artificial. Injustice is concerned with self-interest, while justice is concerned with morality.
Confusing/Interesting
"The State of Nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the Golden age, which poets have invented; only with this difference, that the former is described as full of war, violence, and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and peaceable condition, that can possible be imagined. (312/3.2.2)"
I don't understand how Hume has refuted the idea of "the State of Nature". Everything he says seems to uphold the idea that humans needed to form societies in order to prevent from killing and fighting each other. The notions of property, justice, etc. all these are devised, according to Hume, to stop people from fighting and falling apart and becoming extinct. Is that not the primary thrust of the idea of the State of Nature?
3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from reason-
Perceptions are the core way that ideas are acknowledged by the mind - this includes the passions. Moral good and evil only have value when viewed in relation to other objects. Good, Evil, Virtue and Vice are a posteri, as opposed to a priori, values. In other words, we learn these values after we have lived in the world - they are not universal truths.
3.1.2 Moral Distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense-
If an impression arises that we view as agreeable, or pleasant, it is considered a virtue; If an impression arises that is unfavorable or painful, it is a vice. Nature cannot account for what makes something virtuous or vicious, they are on a level playing field. That which most benefits or creates pleasure becomes a virtue, since this is derived from passions, it is an "artificial" view.
3.2.1 Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?-
Justice is an artificial virtue because it was created by humans as a means to encourage living together in societies and to control this aspect of life around the time that civilization developed. So it is morally good because human nature provided the motive for the establishment of justice.
3.2.2 Of the Origin of Justice and Property-
The relationship between men and their property is moral, not natural, and is based on justice. It is in public interest that we follow the laws of justice in relation to objects and property. Since we have a need for these rules and codes of conduct, it becomes apparent that there is nothing natural about them, or else we wouldn't need them in the first place.
3.3.3 Of the rules, which determine property-
Property is not a natural thing. The relationship between a person and his/her property is purely mental, it is an aspect of the imagination. The idea of property arose around the time of civilization.
3.3.4 Of the transference of property by consent-
The first person to claim/create a piece of property/object becomes the owner of it. The object can only be transferred via occupation, prescription, accession, or succession. Again, these are all artificial and imaginary, rather than absolute, rules. It is a symbolic transfer when this happens.
3.3.5 Of the Obligation of Promises-
A promise is an unnatural change in the obligation of person and his sentiments. Promises are necessary inventions created to help smoothen human relations in societies. This does not, however, mean that there is not moral obligation to fulfill them,
3.3.6 Some further reflections concerning justice and injustice-
The classical interpretation of law is that certain things are eternal, natural, and absolute, Hume argues that this is not the case, they are indeed artificial. Injustice is concerned with self-interest, while justice is concerned with morality.
Confusing/Interesting
"The State of Nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the Golden age, which poets have invented; only with this difference, that the former is described as full of war, violence, and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and peaceable condition, that can possible be imagined. (312/3.2.2)"
I don't understand how Hume has refuted the idea of "the State of Nature". Everything he says seems to uphold the idea that humans needed to form societies in order to prevent from killing and fighting each other. The notions of property, justice, etc. all these are devised, according to Hume, to stop people from fighting and falling apart and becoming extinct. Is that not the primary thrust of the idea of the State of Nature?
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Humified
Hume purports that life in general, and the way in which life is lived, or should be lived, is completely relative to the mind. He places a very high emphasis on the power of passion, rather than reason. There are violent and calm passions, ad these generally counteract each other. To examples of this are pride and humility. Hume begins by debating whether or not these passions are natural or artificial. He comes to the conclusion that because they only arise in regards to an object, that is, there is a direct relation between an object and the feeling of pride or humility, and that the object is always the "self", or the person being affected, they are natural in origin. He goes to observe, using this logic, that sympathy is also an object-affect relationship, in that a person observes another person, and ether feels proud or humbled in relation to that other person's stance in the world. Thus, the power of both comparison and imagination are incredibly important to Hume's moral philosophy. He also brings up love and hatred. The difference here is that one is either Proud or Humbled by external objects or ideas - money, beauty, power, etc. With love/hatred, the passion is directed at another living person. Again, comparison and imagination are brought up - one either wishes to see another succeed and achieve happiness, in the case of love, or fail and be miserable, in the case of hatred.
Monday, September 22, 2008
Random act of kindness
I let my friend use one of my meals over the weekend. So I totally lost a meal, which means I can't eat three square meals every day this week at one of Drake's fine Sodexho establishments. However, he was hungry and had no meals left, so it was my moral duty to give up a meal, an act which I performed with joy.
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Hume Introduction
I understand that Hume believes that the only reason we have an emotion of empathy or compassion is because we are able to see ourselves in that posistion of the person suffering in pain, likewise when we see someone who has pleasure, we are jealous. So the logic is:
A) I am with people who are having pleasure/pain
B) I can imagine myself in that spot
= I either want to be in that spot, or to avoid being in that spot; thus, I should act in a manner that will increase pleasure and reduce pain, for all parties.
A) I am with people who are having pleasure/pain
B) I can imagine myself in that spot
= I either want to be in that spot, or to avoid being in that spot; thus, I should act in a manner that will increase pleasure and reduce pain, for all parties.
Monday, September 15, 2008
BOOK VIII
Okay, so I'm a little less than half way through book 8 and I had something short of a revelation. While reading about Friendship, specifically what Aristotle claims as high order friendship, that relating to the "Good" or the "Friendship of the Good" I came across the following line that struck me.
"The Friendship of the good is also the only kind that is immune to slanders; for it is not easy to give credence to anyone about a person one has scrutinized oneself over a long period; also trust exists between them, and the thought that 'he would never have treated me unjustly', and all the other features that one expects of a friendship that is truly friendship."
When I read this line, the first time that came to my mind was the dynamic tragedy between Julius Caesar and Brutus, specifically, the Shakespearean version of the history and that climatic line, "Et tu Brtute?" before this death. Truly, this fall, this betrayal of that perfect, trusting friendship so elegantly played out by Shakespeare, is the ultimate fear, the ultimate loss. To be murdered is one thing unto itself, but to be murdered and to see one's closest friend, the person that one thinks "would never have treated me unjustly" holding the blade delivering the final blow, well, after seeing that, the emotion that follows would, I am sure, the welcoming of death, the desire to no longer live in a world where that friendship of the good becomes one of betrayal, why, for that person, that Caesar in both the real and metaphorical sense, Death would become the ONLY "true" friend. Death, welcoming, fair, just, and universal. Death cannot be unjust. But I border on Nihilism here.... What is the connection to ethics? The connection, I believe, is thus: That even knowing that no matter how well one knows someone, how long the friendship has lasted, how "scrutinized" the person has been, the motives of the friend can always change, and so there are two options: Isolation, paranoia, and loneiless, or trust, faith, and fellowship; friendship. It is transcending the fears, the suspicions, and possibility for betrayal, to live a life of love and virtue, ergo, happiness. As for Brutus, he realized this too late, "Which one of us did not strike for justice's sake?" He asks, realizing that no one struck for justice's sake but him, he stood alone in that he placed this ideal, this concept, this "society" before his friendship, and, alas he ate coal, unable to live with the guilt. Indeed, Brutus, poor, treacherous Brutus, lacked Phronesis, lacked virtue, lacked friendship to the end.
This example, of course, is using Shakespeare's play, which some historians dispute, and yet no "history" has evoked this emotion in me. So perhaps, those who claim that history is not history of, but history for (i.e. Hayden White, Claude Levi-Strauss) are correct, that history must take a narrative form, always, because the "historian" has only events to deal with, and in recording these events and making necessary connections, he sub-consciously imposes a bias. Now, in relation to ethics, this has me thinking, what if ethics take a narrative form as well? What if people decide to or not to be virtuous is because they "enjoy other's bad qualities" or because of the search for the good and long living friendships, as Aristotle puts forth, but simply because of the signifiers one picks up as a youth, in accordance with the system, the structural way in which he sees the world? And until that structure changes (indeed even those who support "structuralism" debated whether it could consciously change) to align oneself with the virtuous through deliberate action (of course, requiring phronesis) one will not be able to seek out those "good" friends? I noticed other connections in Aristotle's writing as well, for example, Binary Opposition: He lays out that people will seek friendships where one needs something from the other, he gives the example of Rich man/poor man, lover/beloved, beautiful and ugly, Father/Son and different "systems" or structures to categorize the world: "Timocracy" ""Tyranny" "Kingship" "Aristocracy". Aristotle, indeed, is already ordaining the way people act and relate to others in structured ways. Now, that Friendship should be a give-and-take, whereby I do something and then receive a favor, is an odd view for me to comprehend... indeed, perhaps Aristotle has set up too much "Structure", although in a different sense.... So I would argue that for Aristotle the "Vicious" person simply hasn't garnered Phronesis - he is immature, foolish, irrdeliberate, BUT, there is room for redemption. It is, for Aristotle, a choice, a choice that one might not want to make at first or be aware of, but he can change his ways. The Virtuous person, by contrast, is the person who not only has made the choice but transcends the choice - he acts in a manner of excellence, without trying to or without expecting anything in return. In this case, at least limited to the act of virtues and friendship, he steps out of (or into, by choice) those structures Aristotle identified, in order to become a better, happier and more fulfilled person. At any rate, I will now consider Doris:
Doris doesn't exact believe that Generosity implies that one is compassionate, as an example, in the same sense that Aristotle, as I gather, feels that if one practises generosity, they become more compassionate. She notes that behaviour isn't linked to a specific personality trait in studies - it all revolves around the specific situation, and normally outside influences as well (she gives the example of a coin in the phone both making people much more likely to help a person coming out of that phone booth gather his/her belongings). Thus patterns of behaviour are entirely situational, not based on developing traits. So for her, things outside the structure, for a post-structuralist, "the Other", cannot help but affect the decisions that one makes. Perhaps I should help the woman who fell outside the phone booth - Phronesis tells me this is the virtuous thing to do, but then I will miss my bus, which will make me late to my Ethics Final, and thereby cause me to fail the class. Subjectively, I know that no matter how virtuous my actions, making that bus is more important, regardless of being virtuous. Now, If I did not have the stipulation of missing the bus, I would, of course help her, but, forces outside my control in one situation will affect the outcome, forces absent in another situation. So I think that her point is that there is no way of developing these traits and actions, because people act in accordance to the situations, and, in at least some of these, the use of phronesis cannot be the only way to determine the correct course of action. So to her, deliberation is important as well, but it is not deliberation over character as so much as it is deliberation over how to amend the situations that one finds oneself in. Thus one should reflect on the situations one may find oneself in before attending those situations, as Doris points out in the example between a married person and his flirtatious co-worker inviting him/her over when the spouse is away. While one can rely on character once in the situation, it is better to avoid it all together, Doris states. Although to me, it still requires a firm character, and, indeed, phronesis, to decide not to go at all. So I do believe this needs to be specified more (the difference between Character/Situation) before I can fully grasp it. For this reason, I suppose the Virtuous person would be the one who stays home and thus avoids the possibility of an ethical lapse, and the vicious one, acknowledging this, goes anyway, and trusts his own traits and character too much. Again, I cannot tell how Aristotle would respond and that makes this difficult to comment on. I do feel, however, that both have in mind an ideal, the ideal man, ideal way to act, etc. and that we should ascribe to achieving that ideal. The difference is the (most practical?) method used to achieve that ideal.
"The Friendship of the good is also the only kind that is immune to slanders; for it is not easy to give credence to anyone about a person one has scrutinized oneself over a long period; also trust exists between them, and the thought that 'he would never have treated me unjustly', and all the other features that one expects of a friendship that is truly friendship."
When I read this line, the first time that came to my mind was the dynamic tragedy between Julius Caesar and Brutus, specifically, the Shakespearean version of the history and that climatic line, "Et tu Brtute?" before this death. Truly, this fall, this betrayal of that perfect, trusting friendship so elegantly played out by Shakespeare, is the ultimate fear, the ultimate loss. To be murdered is one thing unto itself, but to be murdered and to see one's closest friend, the person that one thinks "would never have treated me unjustly" holding the blade delivering the final blow, well, after seeing that, the emotion that follows would, I am sure, the welcoming of death, the desire to no longer live in a world where that friendship of the good becomes one of betrayal, why, for that person, that Caesar in both the real and metaphorical sense, Death would become the ONLY "true" friend. Death, welcoming, fair, just, and universal. Death cannot be unjust. But I border on Nihilism here.... What is the connection to ethics? The connection, I believe, is thus: That even knowing that no matter how well one knows someone, how long the friendship has lasted, how "scrutinized" the person has been, the motives of the friend can always change, and so there are two options: Isolation, paranoia, and loneiless, or trust, faith, and fellowship; friendship. It is transcending the fears, the suspicions, and possibility for betrayal, to live a life of love and virtue, ergo, happiness. As for Brutus, he realized this too late, "Which one of us did not strike for justice's sake?" He asks, realizing that no one struck for justice's sake but him, he stood alone in that he placed this ideal, this concept, this "society" before his friendship, and, alas he ate coal, unable to live with the guilt. Indeed, Brutus, poor, treacherous Brutus, lacked Phronesis, lacked virtue, lacked friendship to the end.
This example, of course, is using Shakespeare's play, which some historians dispute, and yet no "history" has evoked this emotion in me. So perhaps, those who claim that history is not history of, but history for (i.e. Hayden White, Claude Levi-Strauss) are correct, that history must take a narrative form, always, because the "historian" has only events to deal with, and in recording these events and making necessary connections, he sub-consciously imposes a bias. Now, in relation to ethics, this has me thinking, what if ethics take a narrative form as well? What if people decide to or not to be virtuous is because they "enjoy other's bad qualities" or because of the search for the good and long living friendships, as Aristotle puts forth, but simply because of the signifiers one picks up as a youth, in accordance with the system, the structural way in which he sees the world? And until that structure changes (indeed even those who support "structuralism" debated whether it could consciously change) to align oneself with the virtuous through deliberate action (of course, requiring phronesis) one will not be able to seek out those "good" friends? I noticed other connections in Aristotle's writing as well, for example, Binary Opposition: He lays out that people will seek friendships where one needs something from the other, he gives the example of Rich man/poor man, lover/beloved, beautiful and ugly, Father/Son and different "systems" or structures to categorize the world: "Timocracy" ""Tyranny" "Kingship" "Aristocracy". Aristotle, indeed, is already ordaining the way people act and relate to others in structured ways. Now, that Friendship should be a give-and-take, whereby I do something and then receive a favor, is an odd view for me to comprehend... indeed, perhaps Aristotle has set up too much "Structure", although in a different sense.... So I would argue that for Aristotle the "Vicious" person simply hasn't garnered Phronesis - he is immature, foolish, irrdeliberate, BUT, there is room for redemption. It is, for Aristotle, a choice, a choice that one might not want to make at first or be aware of, but he can change his ways. The Virtuous person, by contrast, is the person who not only has made the choice but transcends the choice - he acts in a manner of excellence, without trying to or without expecting anything in return. In this case, at least limited to the act of virtues and friendship, he steps out of (or into, by choice) those structures Aristotle identified, in order to become a better, happier and more fulfilled person. At any rate, I will now consider Doris:
Doris doesn't exact believe that Generosity implies that one is compassionate, as an example, in the same sense that Aristotle, as I gather, feels that if one practises generosity, they become more compassionate. She notes that behaviour isn't linked to a specific personality trait in studies - it all revolves around the specific situation, and normally outside influences as well (she gives the example of a coin in the phone both making people much more likely to help a person coming out of that phone booth gather his/her belongings). Thus patterns of behaviour are entirely situational, not based on developing traits. So for her, things outside the structure, for a post-structuralist, "the Other", cannot help but affect the decisions that one makes. Perhaps I should help the woman who fell outside the phone booth - Phronesis tells me this is the virtuous thing to do, but then I will miss my bus, which will make me late to my Ethics Final, and thereby cause me to fail the class. Subjectively, I know that no matter how virtuous my actions, making that bus is more important, regardless of being virtuous. Now, If I did not have the stipulation of missing the bus, I would, of course help her, but, forces outside my control in one situation will affect the outcome, forces absent in another situation. So I think that her point is that there is no way of developing these traits and actions, because people act in accordance to the situations, and, in at least some of these, the use of phronesis cannot be the only way to determine the correct course of action. So to her, deliberation is important as well, but it is not deliberation over character as so much as it is deliberation over how to amend the situations that one finds oneself in. Thus one should reflect on the situations one may find oneself in before attending those situations, as Doris points out in the example between a married person and his flirtatious co-worker inviting him/her over when the spouse is away. While one can rely on character once in the situation, it is better to avoid it all together, Doris states. Although to me, it still requires a firm character, and, indeed, phronesis, to decide not to go at all. So I do believe this needs to be specified more (the difference between Character/Situation) before I can fully grasp it. For this reason, I suppose the Virtuous person would be the one who stays home and thus avoids the possibility of an ethical lapse, and the vicious one, acknowledging this, goes anyway, and trusts his own traits and character too much. Again, I cannot tell how Aristotle would respond and that makes this difficult to comment on. I do feel, however, that both have in mind an ideal, the ideal man, ideal way to act, etc. and that we should ascribe to achieving that ideal. The difference is the (most practical?) method used to achieve that ideal.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
On Phroneis
Phroneis is the act of rational, reasonable thinking. It is planning ahead one's moral outlook and actions, rather than just living one minute at a time... it is having a firm-rooted, well thought out moral philosophy revolving around virtues and excellence. Phroneis leads one to develope their own conculsions without forcing one to a binding moral code it is like a whisper in one's ear; a weight on his heart. It is a subtle, weak, but binding voice in the deep recesses of one's mind, pushing them towards the proper decision. Aristotle notes that phroneis isn't "more powerful" or imprtant than the other 4 aspects, one needs to be a balanced, well-rounded person.
I think that both Hurthouse and Aristolte see the faults in having one, unbinding, isuue-specific outlook on morality. Hurthouse notes that in some cases, abortion may be justified in virtue theory, in others, not so much. I believe this holds true to Aristotle's justification of virtue theory. My only qualm is that it is hard, a bit too hard, to justify a "moral reason" or a virtue at times.
I think that both Hurthouse and Aristolte see the faults in having one, unbinding, isuue-specific outlook on morality. Hurthouse notes that in some cases, abortion may be justified in virtue theory, in others, not so much. I believe this holds true to Aristotle's justification of virtue theory. My only qualm is that it is hard, a bit too hard, to justify a "moral reason" or a virtue at times.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Second Aristolte Reading
Aristotle finds it hard to simply and straightforwardly state: This is what makes a virtue a virtue. I think that this isn't because he wants to make future college students confused, but rather because what he is trying to state in words is something that is incredibly hard to express, but I will do my best. For Aristotle, a virtue is something that is preformed that benefits another person, without compromising the benefactor. However, it cannot be preformed for this reason only - the benefactor must genuinely want to preform the action. Thus, whether society views the benefactor as honorable or distinguished, shouldn't effect, positively or negatively, the action that is being preformed. An action shouldn't be preformed because it is considered honorable, rather, an action is considered honorable due to the consequences brings about. A vice, conversely, is an action which a person does to appear honorable or appears distinguished, but really only benefits the person doing it, and normally is an example of extremity, rather than moderation.
I agree with Aristotle to an extent, but I don't think that some of the examples he gives are practical. For example, giving money. It strikes me odd that Aristotle would support giving money to beggars and the weakened class, yet support the system of slavery in Athens. A guess what I am getting at is that he has no specific ideology or belief system that clearly states this kind of action of right, this kind is wrong. In my opinion, ethics are either subjective, or they are universal. There is no middle ground. It seems like Aristotle is trying to use a subjective ethical system based around so called universal ideas and characteristics. His ideas and evidence are fine, but his system and conclusions are what I am having trouble understanding.
I agree with Aristotle to an extent, but I don't think that some of the examples he gives are practical. For example, giving money. It strikes me odd that Aristotle would support giving money to beggars and the weakened class, yet support the system of slavery in Athens. A guess what I am getting at is that he has no specific ideology or belief system that clearly states this kind of action of right, this kind is wrong. In my opinion, ethics are either subjective, or they are universal. There is no middle ground. It seems like Aristotle is trying to use a subjective ethical system based around so called universal ideas and characteristics. His ideas and evidence are fine, but his system and conclusions are what I am having trouble understanding.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Regarding Nicomachean Ethics
It is Aristotle's' stance that the goal of every human is happiness, or fulfillment. He comes to this conclusion through what I suppose could be called deductive reasoning. He begins with the observation that every action a person takes is to achieve some good; generally speaking, people do not set out to act against their own interests. He looks into the reasons for this, and finds that people seek knowledge, and honour and that this things hold little value except in relation to other people. He deducts from this that what people are really searching for is excellence, and that the person who achieves excellence is happy, and thus a fulfilled person. It is through reflection and virtue that this excellence is achieved. He comes to this conclusion by observing that, to quote a cliche, "Practice makes perfect". A person striving to be a shipbuilder begins by learning to build ships; a person striving to be a mathematician practices mathematics and logic. Thus, a person striving for excellence performs actions which are excellent, which leads to happiness. Thus, we become virtuous by undertaking actions which are virtuous. It MUST be a conscious action; to merely preform an act because it is convenient or because it is the only course of action or even because it is an unintentional by-product does not constitute as virtue - virtue must b preformed for virtue's sake. As Aristotle puts it, "Our actions are also responsible for our coming to have dispositions of a certain sort." This is a motif that is found throughout Western Literature, that those who act selfishly or in an evil or morally decrepit manner become selfish, evil, or morally decrepit. Thus, an act is virtuous when the act is preformed knowingly, done for the sake of the virtue in itself, and done with a true and powerful will and belief behind the virtue of the action.
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Pre-Aristolte
I believe that if there is a single goal that all humans are intent on achieving, it is the will to live a justified life, that is, a life that one can be proud of and satisfied with when they die. If this was not the goal of an individual human, then that human would undoubtedly commit suicide because they will have come to the conclusion that life cannot be justified and is therefore not worth living. As Albert Camus wrote, "The greatest philospical question is suicide, all others stem from whether or not life is worth living." What, and the way in which, one defines as "justified" is a different thing unto itself. Because this definition varies from person to person, we can see why there are many different ethical systems that different people adhere to. For me to propose an ethical system that will allow people to live a justified life, therefore, is folly - it is ridiculous, because I don't know what each individual perceives a justification for living. Allow me to make this more clear. It is my belief the intrinsic metaphysical facts of existence do not allow for there to be a universal ethical stance. To quote a line from Stephen Crane:
A man said to the universe: "Sir I exist!"
"However," replied the universe,
"The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation."
This is what I have found, that in their search for justification people look beyond themselves, for a higher power, a higher order or sense of being, in order to give themselves something to live for. To the Christian, the Muslim world-view is absurd, to the Muslim, the Hindu world view is absurd, to the Hindu the Jewish world view is absurd. Religion, and ethical systems based on the metaphysical, all claim to portray the correct way to live. People adhere to these systems because they cannot find justification by themselves, since the basic facts of existence create a sense of indifference. The ONLY way to justify a faith in one of these religious or metaphysically based systems is through Kierkegaardian "leap of faith". It is clear that there is no "proof" that the Jew is correct and the Muslim wrong, or the Christian is correct and the Hindu wrong, etc. If there were, then the whole world would adhere to that belief. Thus, a leap must be mad, but a leap to which religion? The answer is unclear.
Moving on to non-metaphysical based ethical systems, or what I will call "logic based ethical systems", there is no uniformity here either. There are, it appears, to contrasting theories, Utilitarianism, which believes that all decisions should be based on the amount of pleasure (hedons) or pain (dolers) it causes, thus one must be conscious of how one's decisions affect others at all times. The other extreme is Callicles style Ethical Egoism, which states that it is the natural order for the strong to rule over the weak, and that if everyone acting in their own rational self interest, the world would progress better. Which will provide a person a justification for living? Again, I cannot say, that is not my privilege. Both appear to be logical, both have strong arguments for and against them. It is a personal choice, and, indeed, responsibility to choose and defend ones own ethical position, regardless of the details. That, I can conclude, is what MY ethical belief is. It is this:
That every human acknowledge that he/she must justify his/her existence for his/her self, and the means, or ethical system he/she uses to do this is a personal choice that he/she must be prepared to defend, even if it is indefensible, for no other reason than that it justifies his/her life.
A man said to the universe: "Sir I exist!"
"However," replied the universe,
"The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation."
This is what I have found, that in their search for justification people look beyond themselves, for a higher power, a higher order or sense of being, in order to give themselves something to live for. To the Christian, the Muslim world-view is absurd, to the Muslim, the Hindu world view is absurd, to the Hindu the Jewish world view is absurd. Religion, and ethical systems based on the metaphysical, all claim to portray the correct way to live. People adhere to these systems because they cannot find justification by themselves, since the basic facts of existence create a sense of indifference. The ONLY way to justify a faith in one of these religious or metaphysically based systems is through Kierkegaardian "leap of faith". It is clear that there is no "proof" that the Jew is correct and the Muslim wrong, or the Christian is correct and the Hindu wrong, etc. If there were, then the whole world would adhere to that belief. Thus, a leap must be mad, but a leap to which religion? The answer is unclear.
Moving on to non-metaphysical based ethical systems, or what I will call "logic based ethical systems", there is no uniformity here either. There are, it appears, to contrasting theories, Utilitarianism, which believes that all decisions should be based on the amount of pleasure (hedons) or pain (dolers) it causes, thus one must be conscious of how one's decisions affect others at all times. The other extreme is Callicles style Ethical Egoism, which states that it is the natural order for the strong to rule over the weak, and that if everyone acting in their own rational self interest, the world would progress better. Which will provide a person a justification for living? Again, I cannot say, that is not my privilege. Both appear to be logical, both have strong arguments for and against them. It is a personal choice, and, indeed, responsibility to choose and defend ones own ethical position, regardless of the details. That, I can conclude, is what MY ethical belief is. It is this:
That every human acknowledge that he/she must justify his/her existence for his/her self, and the means, or ethical system he/she uses to do this is a personal choice that he/she must be prepared to defend, even if it is indefensible, for no other reason than that it justifies his/her life.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Gorgias II
Callicles takes the position opposite of Socrates and Polus, namely that doing wrong unto others is contemptible. Callicles believes that it is only natural for the strong to rule over the weak, for the powerful to dominate over those without power. He believes that weak and underlings in society always try to take advantage of those in power for a redistribution of resources, which they aren’t strong enough to get for themselves. He claims that, “It’s the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rulers. In making these rulers, they look after themselves and their own self interest, and that’s also the criterion they use when they dispense praise and criticism.” In other words, Callicles claims that the majority of the human race are leaches, intent on mooching off the work of others. He claims these people to be upsetting the “natural law.” His cynicism extents even towards philosophers, when he claims, “In actual fact, philosophers don’t understand the legal system, or know how to address either political or private meetings, or what kinds of things people enjoy or desire.” Thus, he expresses a belief that philosophy is an impractical art form, something lofty and out of touch with reality. In his opinion, it is power that one should be concerned with, not abstract ideals and theories. He sees every individual’s duty, not to be concerned with morality, but with advancing in society and increasing one’s lot in life.
Socrates, of course, attacks these premises and whittles away at Callicles argument. Slowly he makes Callicles retract at least some parts of his argument. By the time he claims “The main question I want to ask is whether or not a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness.” Socrates here drives home the point that if all we did was keep trying to give into our wants and desires, which never cease, we can never achieve happiness. It becomes a vicious, endless circle, which never satisfies us, and always leaves us despairing and longing for more. “It is power that leads men to plumb to the depths of depravity,” He declares. Socrates goes on to reinstate his belief that it is better to be harmed than to harm and links this with Callicles argument that Socrates would end up dead, and unable to defend himself before the courts. “He has all the protection he needs if he’s never wronged a fellow human being or god in anything he’s said or done,” Socrates states when Callicles asks him about a fellow member of the community being unable to defend himself. Truly, he is speaking of himself, and of all men, or of how all men ought to be. Indeed, Socrates declares himself to be “The only statesman in all of Athens” because the politicians don’t truly care about making people morally better, just lust for power, thus, they are failures.
It is clear here that Plato aligns himself with Socrates. Plato, like Socrates, had a disdain for democratic politicians, and devoted his life to writing about “the republic” where a Socrates-esque philosopher-king would rule the populace and oversee the moral advancement of his people, and then created The Academy to find this person. In addition, Socrates hints numerous times at “The good” and the inherent, perfect forms of objects, or feelings. This clearly supports Plato’s ethical and ontological beliefs that there are specific forms that things take, all stemming from the universal Good.
Socrates, of course, attacks these premises and whittles away at Callicles argument. Slowly he makes Callicles retract at least some parts of his argument. By the time he claims “The main question I want to ask is whether or not a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness.” Socrates here drives home the point that if all we did was keep trying to give into our wants and desires, which never cease, we can never achieve happiness. It becomes a vicious, endless circle, which never satisfies us, and always leaves us despairing and longing for more. “It is power that leads men to plumb to the depths of depravity,” He declares. Socrates goes on to reinstate his belief that it is better to be harmed than to harm and links this with Callicles argument that Socrates would end up dead, and unable to defend himself before the courts. “He has all the protection he needs if he’s never wronged a fellow human being or god in anything he’s said or done,” Socrates states when Callicles asks him about a fellow member of the community being unable to defend himself. Truly, he is speaking of himself, and of all men, or of how all men ought to be. Indeed, Socrates declares himself to be “The only statesman in all of Athens” because the politicians don’t truly care about making people morally better, just lust for power, thus, they are failures.
It is clear here that Plato aligns himself with Socrates. Plato, like Socrates, had a disdain for democratic politicians, and devoted his life to writing about “the republic” where a Socrates-esque philosopher-king would rule the populace and oversee the moral advancement of his people, and then created The Academy to find this person. In addition, Socrates hints numerous times at “The good” and the inherent, perfect forms of objects, or feelings. This clearly supports Plato’s ethical and ontological beliefs that there are specific forms that things take, all stemming from the universal Good.
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Gorgias
Gorgias most potently reveals his thoughts on the nature of rhetoric on page 19 – 20, when he declares: “Think of a community – any community you like- and I assure you that if an expert in rhetoric and a doctor went there and had to compete against each other for election as that community’s doctor by addressing the Assembly, or some other public meeting, the doctor would be left standing, and the effective speaker would win the election, if that is what he wanted … It’s inconceivable that a professional of any stamp could speak more persuasively in front of a crowd than a rhetorian on any topic at all.”
What Gorgias has revealed here about his profession is that it is nothing more that the art of presumption, of dolling up, of deception. Gorgias is no different than a con artist, or a telephone salesman. While rhetoric may very well be an art form, it is an art form only in relation to other art forms. In other words, if there were no doctors, being able to speak and act like a doctor holds no value. Gorgias is not judged on his skills in reality, but on his skills to sell his skills, regardless of whether or not those skills exist. He believes that this is true power, the ability to make people feel, and connect, and understand, and believe what he is saying, even if what he is saying is false or wrong. To Gorgias, that is what makes rhetoric such a powerful tool. To Socrates, however, it is nothing more than an empty pseudoscience, void of any real power or ability.
“By in front of a crowd, you meant in front of non-experts, didn’t you? I mean a rhetorian wouldn’t be more persuasive in front of an audience of experts, of course. (23)” Socrates poises this question to Gorgias, who has no choice but to agree. In this short beginning of this passage, Socrates has already defeated Gorgias’ main argument. He has called Gorgias’ bluff – that the rhetorian doesn’t have a profession to himself, he merely appears to be in a state of knowing and power. The person who uses his persuasive power foolishly and ends up making empty, false arguments is just a chatterbox. Truth, and the search for truth, is a much higher goal than trying to abuse, or manipulate truth.
Polus takes up Gorgias cause and brings it a step further, in his argument over whether or not it is just to harm another person, or to be harmed. Polus argues on page 49 that it is less desirable to have a wrong committed to him, but that it is more desirable to commit a wrong to someone else than to be punished. “Which do you think is worse, doing wrong, or having wrong done to you?” “Doing wrong” “Well isn’t it worse, given that it is more contemptible?” “Certainly not.” Here, we see that Polus is representing a form of ethical egoism, that whatever advances his position is the correct course of action. Socrates counters this by claiming a sort of “natural balance”. Just as good things are more admirable, so too is performing a good deed to someone else. It becomes apparent, to Socrates, that just as a doctor aids the physically ailed body, the Judge aids the morally decrepit mind. He points out that happiness is a journey – people don’t perform an action out of happiness, but rather to achieve happiness.
“Now, imagine two people both of whom are physically or psychologically in a bad state. One of them is receiving treatment and is being freed from his badness, while the other isn’t, and so still has it. Which of these two people is worse off?” Socrates uses this example to prove his point that being punished is in the best interest of the criminal. My objection to this line of thought is that medical treatment is natural, and objective. Punishment is subject to laws of men, which are not universal or based on morals or psychology.
What Gorgias has revealed here about his profession is that it is nothing more that the art of presumption, of dolling up, of deception. Gorgias is no different than a con artist, or a telephone salesman. While rhetoric may very well be an art form, it is an art form only in relation to other art forms. In other words, if there were no doctors, being able to speak and act like a doctor holds no value. Gorgias is not judged on his skills in reality, but on his skills to sell his skills, regardless of whether or not those skills exist. He believes that this is true power, the ability to make people feel, and connect, and understand, and believe what he is saying, even if what he is saying is false or wrong. To Gorgias, that is what makes rhetoric such a powerful tool. To Socrates, however, it is nothing more than an empty pseudoscience, void of any real power or ability.
“By in front of a crowd, you meant in front of non-experts, didn’t you? I mean a rhetorian wouldn’t be more persuasive in front of an audience of experts, of course. (23)” Socrates poises this question to Gorgias, who has no choice but to agree. In this short beginning of this passage, Socrates has already defeated Gorgias’ main argument. He has called Gorgias’ bluff – that the rhetorian doesn’t have a profession to himself, he merely appears to be in a state of knowing and power. The person who uses his persuasive power foolishly and ends up making empty, false arguments is just a chatterbox. Truth, and the search for truth, is a much higher goal than trying to abuse, or manipulate truth.
Polus takes up Gorgias cause and brings it a step further, in his argument over whether or not it is just to harm another person, or to be harmed. Polus argues on page 49 that it is less desirable to have a wrong committed to him, but that it is more desirable to commit a wrong to someone else than to be punished. “Which do you think is worse, doing wrong, or having wrong done to you?” “Doing wrong” “Well isn’t it worse, given that it is more contemptible?” “Certainly not.” Here, we see that Polus is representing a form of ethical egoism, that whatever advances his position is the correct course of action. Socrates counters this by claiming a sort of “natural balance”. Just as good things are more admirable, so too is performing a good deed to someone else. It becomes apparent, to Socrates, that just as a doctor aids the physically ailed body, the Judge aids the morally decrepit mind. He points out that happiness is a journey – people don’t perform an action out of happiness, but rather to achieve happiness.
“Now, imagine two people both of whom are physically or psychologically in a bad state. One of them is receiving treatment and is being freed from his badness, while the other isn’t, and so still has it. Which of these two people is worse off?” Socrates uses this example to prove his point that being punished is in the best interest of the criminal. My objection to this line of thought is that medical treatment is natural, and objective. Punishment is subject to laws of men, which are not universal or based on morals or psychology.
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