Doubt 2

When I reread the play, I actually found myself admiring Sister Aloysius more than I did the first time. There is a lot, I think, that is admirable in the way in which her strict, harshness is grounded in what can only be called morally necessity. She has chosen to walk down a path of isolation in pursuit of helping others, albeit unusually, but also in a more productive manner, and in doing so, is promoting the greater good, which I suppose would make her a utilitarian. By putting aside her own desires, she can better bring about utility in others. That's my impression. For me, this second reading has given me a better insight into the different ways in which people view the job of a moral cultivator. By that, I mean that in my first reading, I despised Sister Aloysius for similar reasons that I admire her this time. I had to look past my own prejudices about what a "moral person" is in order to really understand what this person was trying to do.

ASIDE: I understand what Professor McCrickerd was saying earlier in class today about a teacher not being a friend, but rather someone that students should be slightly distanced from and should look up to as an example. I pretty much agree with that, but upon thinking it over, I think that there is more to that teachers have to offer. The teacher, I feel, should be mentor. Where would Heidegger be without Husserl? Wittgenstein without Russell? In order to be a mentor, you have to be that person's friend. That doesn't mean you have to go out drinking or partying with them, but it does mean that there needs to be a positive relationship that both parties feel is beneficial in some way. I believe it was Aristotle, maybe Plato, who had differing degrees of friendship. At one stage, there's the friend who advises the other, and one who receives the advise, but it's not in dogmatic way, rather a comfortable, productive manner. Anyway, that's just my thoughts.

Doubt

Doubt was a powerful play to read. It struck me several times as I was reading it hard. Father Flynn's speech at the beginning of the play was very Existential, I thought. It was something I could easily have pictured reading in Kierkegaard. The over all theme of the play, was not, as I thought it would be, so much about faith in God as it was in faith in other people. Sister Aloysius, was a fantastic character. She represented two things to me at the beginning of the play. First, she was a manifestation of the kind of self-righteous, completely hypocritical Christian that I do not care for. On the other hand, I admired her detachment and stern conviction. Insofar as her view was diametrically opposed to Father Flynn's, and yet Father Flynn was clearly an immoral person, while her outlook was more dogmatic, and yet she, in the end was morally vindicated, made an interesting drama. For Sister Aloysius, those who have undertaken holy orders are above the ministry, and should serve as role models, if not idols. Fr. Flynn, however, argues that Priests should serve the ministry, rather than act so high and mighty. This is of the utmost importance because it leads the readers to sympathize with Fr. Flynn perspective, even though he was in the wrong, and even though Sr. Aloysius still cared about the people in the ministry.

Now, based on a Kantian approach to morality, Sister Aloysius was immoral, because she lied in order to get the end result. This would, most likely, violate the Categorical Imperative as it would be irrational that everyone would lie if they wanted information from another person verified. For Mill, too, while her aim was noble, the end result is highly likely to cause more pain than pleasure, again, making the consequence of the act immoral. I think that realizing this is what caused Sister Aloysius to break down at the of the play - it was too much to handle and she had no options.

I'm not sure who I most admire. Sister James was far too passive and easily manipulated to be admirable. Sister Aloysius' Stern conviction is admirable, but the means by which she accomplishes her goal is very Machiavellian and, were she willing to defend that philosophy, would be admirable, but seeing as she is distraught by taking those actions she cannot be admirable. Fr. Flynn, were he innocent, would have been admirable, but in guilt, becomes a despicable hypocrite. Ms. Muller had conviction, was genuinely looking out for her son's best interests and in the end, she was correct, because Sr. Aloysius did end up creating more harm than good, and Fr. Flynn ended up being rewarded. Therefore, for her conviction, sense of justice, and down to earth approach to the situation, I name Ms. Muller the Most Admirable.

I don't know who of the above to sympathize with. Much for the same reasons they are not admirable, I have no sympathy for them. So I supposed I'd be most sympathetic towards the kid, Thomas.

The way in which the author structured the play around truth, lack of clarity, and connections that one had to make for himself, he pretty well situated the ambiguous and cloudy nature of discerning truth claims in the real world.

ROK4

The other day in my resident hall, a group of students approached me in the froyer to ask if I wanted to help them make cards for soliders oversees. I was busy, and didn't know anyone in the group, nor did I really want to. Thus, I said No thanks and walked away. Later that day, however, as I was coming back from class, I saw them again, and, this time, my motives still unchanged, sat down and helped them out. It was good times.

ROK3

Sunday is recycling day in my hall. One of the hardest things about recycling, especially in GK, is the crazy amount of stuff that the EC's have to go around and pick up. The other day, I noticed as I came back that some one's bag broke and spilled garbage everywhere. Thus, I stopped and helped them pick up the trash for about 15 minutes until it was all done.

Mill and Social Situations

What struck me about this chapter was how much emphasis Mill puts on Social things in general. Social duties, social obligations, social utility, etc. My point is he puts a lot thought into the idea of humanity as a social collection of beings, so to speak. Now this really drives Mill's entire philosophy. This is evident from his conception of justice. For Mill, I believe, one of the main arguments against Utilitarianism is the idea of justice and injustice. How can, if society is driven by the idea of the greater good, injustice laws arise? Mill's view, again, on Justice is that it is a set of moral requirements that promote social utility, thus making it of the most important degree. This explains, for Mill, how the idea or conception of Justice changes from time to time and society to society - because man, being a social creature, must adapt his responses to moral situations depending on the level of utility involved. He uses the example of Hammurabi's code to illustrate this, and how, even if said code isn't used any more, most people feel a twinge of yearning for that kind of justice still. This is, for Mill, a natural, rather than a social, response.

Utility and such

My understanding of Utilitarianism is thus: That a decision is moral if the outcome of that decision creates a greater amount of good than it does evil. This can be applied to small as well as large scale situations. What I am still a bit confused about is too whether or not Mill believes that this is something that rational people will just naturally do, or if it is the course of action we should, rather than always do, take. For example, if we always put the idea of the "Greater Happiness" theory to work, everyone would a vegan. Mill, and most contemporary Utilitarians I know of, were animal rights activists.

To Mill, it matters very little whether from an epistemological standpoint a person is an emphirist or a rationalist, believes in a priori principles or learning through experience. The fact of the matter is, according Mill, is that ALL ethical theories have one thing in common - the ultimate goal is happiness. Thus, he doesn't feel that he needs to provide a much further proof, than that all other theories revolve around the notion of happiness. He has simply forged from that a more comprehensive, sensible, from his perspective, theory. He believes that certain things are simply desirable - if one desires money, he will work within the context of the socio-economic structure to earn that money. Likewise, if one desires to create happiness, he will work within the context of an ethical system (Utilitarianism) that creates the most happiness.

Mill Prep

It would certainly seem that the act of causing pain would be considered immoral, and that causing happiness would be considered moral. There are critics of this idea however, Kierkegaard said something along the lines of, "The pursuit of Pleasure or Pain? Is not that what motivates a slug?" So while innately acting in a manner that produces pleasure can be viewed as good, and a manner that decreases pain is also good, I don't see a fundamental argument that can be made from a metaphysical perspective (like Kant) in favor of this form of ethics. If one is to argue that the action that has the most positive consequences is best, I would have to ask, best for whom? Aren't consequences nearly always subjective (or at least how one views consquences)?

O'Neill's Ethics

O'Neill agrees with Kant insofar as she believes that we ought to avoid contradicting ourselves from a moral and metaphysical sense. Where she differs however, is over the issue of children's rights. Children who are abused, mentally, physically, or sexually, are more apt to develop psychological problems in their older years that will impair them from making the kind of rational decisions they need in order to be morally justified. So we don't have the right to disobey this duty; we must do it. Unlike the Kantian outlook, these things must be upheld for the future of the human race. This being said, I found it rather hard to pin down what O'Neill was saying, but I think that I nailed down the general idea.

ROK2

Tonight, despite my fever, I did my laundry. After using the dryer, I cleaned off the lint vent. After that, I decided to clean all of the dryer lint from all the dryers. A lot of people don't do that when they finish drying. At any rate, I figured that was a good act of kindness, since I hate forgetting to do that and then having my laundry ruined.

"The Metaphysics of Morals"

Doctrine of Right

Here Kant discusses objects and how one comes into possession of Objects. My understanding from the reading is that anything that is a physical enentity (a book, a plot of land, even another person) can be considered an object. First, the relationship between the person and the object in question is important. The person who ha first "dibs", so to speak, on the object is the person who should be recognized as the owner (this is a natural right for Kant). The problem arises when one is away from the object in question. For example, should I set down my book or travel away from my land, what is there to stop someone else from coming alone and claiming that he found the object in question first? Kant's way of rectifying this situation is through a civil constitution, which, while protecting natural rights (lest it be invalid), is a form of common agreement, whereby my objects are recognized as mine, insofar as I concede to recognize the objects of others as theirs.

I'm still a bit confused about Kant's exact definition of a "natural right" as opposed to, I suppose, an unnatural or synthetic right. Is it in any way simple to the way Hume distinguishes between artificial and natural virtues?

Kant goes on to argue that Land is the first thing that people can lay a claim to. All men, according to Kant, begin with a plot of land, in order to nurture themselves, etc. In the Hobbesian state of nature, one can own land, but it is doomed to change hands by force. So for Kant, again, the Civil constitution is necessary to protect rights. My question for Kant would be: Why is there such a need, and even a right to ownership of land? Surely it is NOT natural that a person can own a piece of the earth? It is true that animals will mark their territory, but so far as I have seen they do not assume the right to do what so ever they please with this territory. I am apprehensive as to what Kant would say to Marx, and the ideal that things like property and ownership of land are unnecessary and infringe, rather than enhance, human interaction. Again, I understand that Kant is not so much concerned with consequences, which is why I question the origins and justification for his thoughts. I accept the premise that if everyone adhered to a civil constitution and claimed ownership of land that they first claimed or inherited, this does not created a contradiction. However, it does seem to be a contradiction of nature to simply say "I own this LAND (if by land we mean "this piece of the planet upon which I live, from this point on the surface unto the core of the Earth, or at least as far as I can find things with which to live a fulfilling life)."

Moving on, it is apparent that for Kant, all rights and relations center around property, or ownership of objects. Marriage = contract to share objects. Children and parents = no contract necessary, once they can support themselves physically, they are gone. Neither party is in debt to each other.

Kant goes on to discuss a number of things kind of related to property. Money is a simple representation of goods, all and any goods. A book is writing (which is conceptual), that is conceived by an author, who gives permission to a publisher to "speak" for the author via the distribution of a book. Thereby, the author's mandate must be given to the publisher, lest it be an infringement of right. This all seems perfectly logical.

Kant's main point, without summarizing the every detail of the rest of the book is basically this: That human society, in order to function properly needs to adhere to the categorical imperative. In order that this may be the case, we must enter into contracts to ensure that this Categorical Imperative is, in fact upheld. All rights need to be protected, rights are a priori and stem from non-contradiction.

Introdcing Kant

So my basic understanding of what Kant is trying to do is thus:


Metaphysics can be considered a system. Insofar as there is a system to science, a system to writing, a system to education, there is also a system to the universe and things beyond physics. From here, we get a rather precise (as opposed to a more Platonic-ish) view of the nature of the metaphysical. Where Kant is in line with Plato is that Metaphysics are a priori, they exist, and can be known, before we come into being. In this regard, Kant considers morals metaphysical, because they are timeless and universal, and it is our duty to discover and adhere to these metaphysical morals. Again, Kant uses things like Pure Reason, Freedom, Rationalism, and a slew of other terms and definitions which all fit into his modernist enlightenment philosophy. In part because there are so many terms, and in part because I don't remember or know the way in which he is using them, I am not posting them here. However, I do know that he takes the idea of freedom very seriously, as well as the notion it is a function of the purely rational mind. Duty, to Kant, is something to which we are bound - to Kant, we are bound to Morality because of its metaphysicallity, and from here he gets his categorical imperative.

Now, once Kant gets into the specific introductions of each book, he loses me. In other words, I can read what is on the page, but I fail to see how it relates to his previous statements. I look forward to discussing this in class.

Crazy Kant and Nothingness in Non-Contradiction

I am going to be honest here. I know Kant's basic moral "Categorical Imperative" and I hate it. My summary would be this: Act only in accordance with a maxim that you believe should become a universal law. Thus, if I believe the maxim "Thief is wrong." Then I should never steal, because that indicates that I believe that this should be a universal law. This is where I have problems. I am not a Kant scholar, and I am sure that he addresses this, but there is nothing, given Kant's obsession with not contradicting himself, that would pass as morally acceptable then. Another example - suppose a jobless single Mother has no choice but to steal to feed her children? Should she, in the pursuit of some abstract ideal (non-contradiction) simply let her children starve? To a Kantian, who believes thief is either always wrong or always right, the answer is yes. That is the problem with the notion that contradiction is never appropriate. Circumstances change - Kant (to the best of my knowledge, hopefully he proves me wrong) takes no account of this - everything is black and white. Thus, any and all approaches to ethics that I will come up with will not be based SOLELY on the notion of non-contradiction. I would argue that a better version of this theory than Kant's would be to not hold any values in regard what so ever, since it is only human to have to break them. As a matter of fact, I would argue (again, keeping in mind the follies of contradiction) that the only thing one can put a value on is one's own life (and possible the life of family members or very close friends) since that is the only thing people will actively pursue to protect. When the life is threatened universal laws and categorical imperatives disappear. To clarify, I am not arguing for a Nihilistic outlook, if anything the opposite - it is the notion that some how by protecting our lives and the lives of those close to us is to be frowned upon when weighed against acting the same way in different situations (even if this is not the RATIONAL thing to do) is the ideal that is truly foolish and lacking meaning.

Principles of Morals, 1

I argee with the majority of Hume scholars out there - "A Treatise Concerning Human Nature" is a much better book in terms of Philosophy. This text simply doesn't provide the same kind of detailed, scientific approach as the other one. Hume uses lots of examples, but there is little detailed explaination of his points. In fact, I wouldn't understand them as well if I hadn't read the other book first. Nonetheless, I garner that Hume is arguing in this book that morals are not dependant on reason, in fact he criticizes the ancient philosophers who thought that they were based on pure reason. He argues that everyone should take up philosophy and learn this moral code, because according to Hume, understanding morality enables us to understand our duty, in relation to other people and society at large. He also pushes the notion of benevolence again, insisting that by doing good, man receives the benefits of good coming his way. I was surprised that he didn't mention sympathy here. Hume goes on to argue (as he did before) that justice is an invention of mankind and that there are circumstances where it would not exist, for example in Eden or if there were no other people. Justice arose and arises at the demand of people, in order to maintain control, after property has been established. Allegiance, as well, is an issue of personal security - by lending one's allegiance, it strengthens society and the preservation of peace. These issues are obviously very big and ones that affect people's lives. The sense of duty regarding ethics, the ideas of Justice and Allegiance, this things have a great impact on our lives, and so are certainly worth studying and reading about.

Hume, Final Reading

So in this reading, Hume distgunishes between natural and artifical virtues. As aforementioned, the idea of Justice is an artifical virtue. Hume believes this because in certain instances, when universally applied, justice can wrongfully cause a person pain. However, overall, it is an invention that men need in order to live together in society. So for Hume, a natural virtue would be something that is a direct result of our mind or sympathy in particular. Generally speaking the idea of justice is too far detached from our own perceptions to be considered "natural". He also stresses the importance of pride, saying that it is key to the "heroic virtues".

I had a problem with a paragraph where Hume does speak about logic, and strings together several seemingly contradictory ideas:

"The nessacary consquence of there principals is, that pride, or an overweaning conciet of others, must be vicious; since it causes uneasiness in all men.... tis our own pride which makes us so displeased of the pride of others.... but the proud can never endure the proud." (3.3.2.7)

I'm not sure what to make of all this here....

Hume, Third Reading

Hume, using his belief that reason simply is a tool that asses the validity of our goals and tries to achieve them, makes the case in this reading that many beliefs humans hold (Justice, Property, Virtues, etc.) are simply weighted as good because they benefit or excite our passions. In this regard, his empiricist bent is clearly showing.

3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from reason-
Perceptions are the core way that ideas are acknowledged by the mind - this includes the passions. Moral good and evil only have value when viewed in relation to other objects. Good, Evil, Virtue and Vice are a posteri, as opposed to a priori, values. In other words, we learn these values after we have lived in the world - they are not universal truths.

3.1.2 Moral Distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense-
If an impression arises that we view as agreeable, or pleasant, it is considered a virtue; If an impression arises that is unfavorable or painful, it is a vice. Nature cannot account for what makes something virtuous or vicious, they are on a level playing field. That which most benefits or creates pleasure becomes a virtue, since this is derived from passions, it is an "artificial" view.

3.2.1 Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?-
Justice is an artificial virtue because it was created by humans as a means to encourage living together in societies and to control this aspect of life around the time that civilization developed. So it is morally good because human nature provided the motive for the establishment of justice.

3.2.2 Of the Origin of Justice and Property-
The relationship between men and their property is moral, not natural, and is based on justice. It is in public interest that we follow the laws of justice in relation to objects and property. Since we have a need for these rules and codes of conduct, it becomes apparent that there is nothing natural about them, or else we wouldn't need them in the first place.

3.3.3 Of the rules, which determine property-
Property is not a natural thing. The relationship between a person and his/her property is purely mental, it is an aspect of the imagination. The idea of property arose around the time of civilization.

3.3.4 Of the transference of property by consent-
The first person to claim/create a piece of property/object becomes the owner of it. The object can only be transferred via occupation, prescription, accession, or succession. Again, these are all artificial and imaginary, rather than absolute, rules. It is a symbolic transfer when this happens.

3.3.5 Of the Obligation of Promises-
A promise is an unnatural change in the obligation of person and his sentiments. Promises are necessary inventions created to help smoothen human relations in societies. This does not, however, mean that there is not moral obligation to fulfill them,

3.3.6 Some further reflections concerning justice and injustice-
The classical interpretation of law is that certain things are eternal, natural, and absolute, Hume argues that this is not the case, they are indeed artificial. Injustice is concerned with self-interest, while justice is concerned with morality.

Confusing/Interesting

"The State of Nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the Golden age, which poets have invented; only with this difference, that the former is described as full of war, violence, and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and peaceable condition, that can possible be imagined. (312/3.2.2)"

I don't understand how Hume has refuted the idea of "the State of Nature". Everything he says seems to uphold the idea that humans needed to form societies in order to prevent from killing and fighting each other. The notions of property, justice, etc. all these are devised, according to Hume, to stop people from fighting and falling apart and becoming extinct. Is that not the primary thrust of the idea of the State of Nature?

Humified

Hume purports that life in general, and the way in which life is lived, or should be lived, is completely relative to the mind. He places a very high emphasis on the power of passion, rather than reason. There are violent and calm passions, ad these generally counteract each other. To examples of this are pride and humility. Hume begins by debating whether or not these passions are natural or artificial. He comes to the conclusion that because they only arise in regards to an object, that is, there is a direct relation between an object and the feeling of pride or humility, and that the object is always the "self", or the person being affected, they are natural in origin. He goes to observe, using this logic, that sympathy is also an object-affect relationship, in that a person observes another person, and ether feels proud or humbled in relation to that other person's stance in the world. Thus, the power of both comparison and imagination are incredibly important to Hume's moral philosophy. He also brings up love and hatred. The difference here is that one is either Proud or Humbled by external objects or ideas - money, beauty, power, etc. With love/hatred, the passion is directed at another living person. Again, comparison and imagination are brought up - one either wishes to see another succeed and achieve happiness, in the case of love, or fail and be miserable, in the case of hatred.

Random act of kindness

I let my friend use one of my meals over the weekend. So I totally lost a meal, which means I can't eat three square meals every day this week at one of Drake's fine Sodexho establishments. However, he was hungry and had no meals left, so it was my moral duty to give up a meal, an act which I performed with joy.

Hume Introduction

I understand that Hume believes that the only reason we have an emotion of empathy or compassion is because we are able to see ourselves in that posistion of the person suffering in pain, likewise when we see someone who has pleasure, we are jealous. So the logic is:

A) I am with people who are having pleasure/pain
B) I can imagine myself in that spot

= I either want to be in that spot, or to avoid being in that spot; thus, I should act in a manner that will increase pleasure and reduce pain, for all parties.

BOOK VIII

Okay, so I'm a little less than half way through book 8 and I had something short of a revelation. While reading about Friendship, specifically what Aristotle claims as high order friendship, that relating to the "Good" or the "Friendship of the Good" I came across the following line that struck me.

"The Friendship of the good is also the only kind that is immune to slanders; for it is not easy to give credence to anyone about a person one has scrutinized oneself over a long period; also trust exists between them, and the thought that 'he would never have treated me unjustly', and all the other features that one expects of a friendship that is truly friendship."

When I read this line, the first time that came to my mind was the dynamic tragedy between Julius Caesar and Brutus, specifically, the Shakespearean version of the history and that climatic line, "Et tu Brtute?" before this death. Truly, this fall, this betrayal of that perfect, trusting friendship so elegantly played out by Shakespeare, is the ultimate fear, the ultimate loss. To be murdered is one thing unto itself, but to be murdered and to see one's closest friend, the person that one thinks "would never have treated me unjustly" holding the blade delivering the final blow, well, after seeing that, the emotion that follows would, I am sure, the welcoming of death, the desire to no longer live in a world where that friendship of the good becomes one of betrayal, why, for that person, that Caesar in both the real and metaphorical sense, Death would become the ONLY "true" friend. Death, welcoming, fair, just, and universal. Death cannot be unjust. But I border on Nihilism here.... What is the connection to ethics? The connection, I believe, is thus: That even knowing that no matter how well one knows someone, how long the friendship has lasted, how "scrutinized" the person has been, the motives of the friend can always change, and so there are two options: Isolation, paranoia, and loneiless, or trust, faith, and fellowship; friendship. It is transcending the fears, the suspicions, and possibility for betrayal, to live a life of love and virtue, ergo, happiness. As for Brutus, he realized this too late, "Which one of us did not strike for justice's sake?" He asks, realizing that no one struck for justice's sake but him, he stood alone in that he placed this ideal, this concept, this "society" before his friendship, and, alas he ate coal, unable to live with the guilt. Indeed, Brutus, poor, treacherous Brutus, lacked Phronesis, lacked virtue, lacked friendship to the end.

This example, of course, is using Shakespeare's play, which some historians dispute, and yet no "history" has evoked this emotion in me. So perhaps, those who claim that history is not history of, but history for (i.e. Hayden White, Claude Levi-Strauss) are correct, that history must take a narrative form, always, because the "historian" has only events to deal with, and in recording these events and making necessary connections, he sub-consciously imposes a bias. Now, in relation to ethics, this has me thinking, what if ethics take a narrative form as well? What if people decide to or not to be virtuous is because they "enjoy other's bad qualities" or because of the search for the good and long living friendships, as Aristotle puts forth, but simply because of the signifiers one picks up as a youth, in accordance with the system, the structural way in which he sees the world? And until that structure changes (indeed even those who support "structuralism" debated whether it could consciously change) to align oneself with the virtuous through deliberate action (of course, requiring phronesis) one will not be able to seek out those "good" friends? I noticed other connections in Aristotle's writing as well, for example, Binary Opposition: He lays out that people will seek friendships where one needs something from the other, he gives the example of Rich man/poor man, lover/beloved, beautiful and ugly, Father/Son and different "systems" or structures to categorize the world: "Timocracy" ""Tyranny" "Kingship" "Aristocracy". Aristotle, indeed, is already ordaining the way people act and relate to others in structured ways. Now, that Friendship should be a give-and-take, whereby I do something and then receive a favor, is an odd view for me to comprehend... indeed, perhaps Aristotle has set up too much "Structure", although in a different sense.... So I would argue that for Aristotle the "Vicious" person simply hasn't garnered Phronesis - he is immature, foolish, irrdeliberate, BUT, there is room for redemption. It is, for Aristotle, a choice, a choice that one might not want to make at first or be aware of, but he can change his ways. The Virtuous person, by contrast, is the person who not only has made the choice but transcends the choice - he acts in a manner of excellence, without trying to or without expecting anything in return. In this case, at least limited to the act of virtues and friendship, he steps out of (or into, by choice) those structures Aristotle identified, in order to become a better, happier and more fulfilled person. At any rate, I will now consider Doris:

Doris doesn't exact believe that Generosity implies that one is compassionate, as an example, in the same sense that Aristotle, as I gather, feels that if one practises generosity, they become more compassionate. She notes that behaviour isn't linked to a specific personality trait in studies - it all revolves around the specific situation, and normally outside influences as well (she gives the example of a coin in the phone both making people much more likely to help a person coming out of that phone booth gather his/her belongings). Thus patterns of behaviour are entirely situational, not based on developing traits. So for her, things outside the structure, for a post-structuralist, "the Other", cannot help but affect the decisions that one makes. Perhaps I should help the woman who fell outside the phone booth - Phronesis tells me this is the virtuous thing to do, but then I will miss my bus, which will make me late to my Ethics Final, and thereby cause me to fail the class. Subjectively, I know that no matter how virtuous my actions, making that bus is more important, regardless of being virtuous. Now, If I did not have the stipulation of missing the bus, I would, of course help her, but, forces outside my control in one situation will affect the outcome, forces absent in another situation. So I think that her point is that there is no way of developing these traits and actions, because people act in accordance to the situations, and, in at least some of these, the use of phronesis cannot be the only way to determine the correct course of action. So to her, deliberation is important as well, but it is not deliberation over character as so much as it is deliberation over how to amend the situations that one finds oneself in. Thus one should reflect on the situations one may find oneself in before attending those situations, as Doris points out in the example between a married person and his flirtatious co-worker inviting him/her over when the spouse is away. While one can rely on character once in the situation, it is better to avoid it all together, Doris states. Although to me, it still requires a firm character, and, indeed, phronesis, to decide not to go at all. So I do believe this needs to be specified more (the difference between Character/Situation) before I can fully grasp it. For this reason, I suppose the Virtuous person would be the one who stays home and thus avoids the possibility of an ethical lapse, and the vicious one, acknowledging this, goes anyway, and trusts his own traits and character too much. Again, I cannot tell how Aristotle would respond and that makes this difficult to comment on. I do feel, however, that both have in mind an ideal, the ideal man, ideal way to act, etc. and that we should ascribe to achieving that ideal. The difference is the (most practical?) method used to achieve that ideal.

On Phroneis

Phroneis is the act of rational, reasonable thinking. It is planning ahead one's moral outlook and actions, rather than just living one minute at a time... it is having a firm-rooted, well thought out moral philosophy revolving around virtues and excellence. Phroneis leads one to develope their own conculsions without forcing one to a binding moral code it is like a whisper in one's ear; a weight on his heart. It is a subtle, weak, but binding voice in the deep recesses of one's mind, pushing them towards the proper decision. Aristotle notes that phroneis isn't "more powerful" or imprtant than the other 4 aspects, one needs to be a balanced, well-rounded person.

I think that both Hurthouse and Aristolte see the faults in having one, unbinding, isuue-specific outlook on morality. Hurthouse notes that in some cases, abortion may be justified in virtue theory, in others, not so much. I believe this holds true to Aristotle's justification of virtue theory. My only qualm is that it is hard, a bit too hard, to justify a "moral reason" or a virtue at times.

Second Aristolte Reading

Aristotle finds it hard to simply and straightforwardly state: This is what makes a virtue a virtue. I think that this isn't because he wants to make future college students confused, but rather because what he is trying to state in words is something that is incredibly hard to express, but I will do my best. For Aristotle, a virtue is something that is preformed that benefits another person, without compromising the benefactor. However, it cannot be preformed for this reason only - the benefactor must genuinely want to preform the action. Thus, whether society views the benefactor as honorable or distinguished, shouldn't effect, positively or negatively, the action that is being preformed. An action shouldn't be preformed because it is considered honorable, rather, an action is considered honorable due to the consequences brings about. A vice, conversely, is an action which a person does to appear honorable or appears distinguished, but really only benefits the person doing it, and normally is an example of extremity, rather than moderation.

I agree with Aristotle to an extent, but I don't think that some of the examples he gives are practical. For example, giving money. It strikes me odd that Aristotle would support giving money to beggars and the weakened class, yet support the system of slavery in Athens. A guess what I am getting at is that he has no specific ideology or belief system that clearly states this kind of action of right, this kind is wrong. In my opinion, ethics are either subjective, or they are universal. There is no middle ground. It seems like Aristotle is trying to use a subjective ethical system based around so called universal ideas and characteristics. His ideas and evidence are fine, but his system and conclusions are what I am having trouble understanding.

Regarding Nicomachean Ethics

It is Aristotle's' stance that the goal of every human is happiness, or fulfillment. He comes to this conclusion through what I suppose could be called deductive reasoning. He begins with the observation that every action a person takes is to achieve some good; generally speaking, people do not set out to act against their own interests. He looks into the reasons for this, and finds that people seek knowledge, and honour and that this things hold little value except in relation to other people. He deducts from this that what people are really searching for is excellence, and that the person who achieves excellence is happy, and thus a fulfilled person. It is through reflection and virtue that this excellence is achieved. He comes to this conclusion by observing that, to quote a cliche, "Practice makes perfect". A person striving to be a shipbuilder begins by learning to build ships; a person striving to be a mathematician practices mathematics and logic. Thus, a person striving for excellence performs actions which are excellent, which leads to happiness. Thus, we become virtuous by undertaking actions which are virtuous. It MUST be a conscious action; to merely preform an act because it is convenient or because it is the only course of action or even because it is an unintentional by-product does not constitute as virtue - virtue must b preformed for virtue's sake. As Aristotle puts it, "Our actions are also responsible for our coming to have dispositions of a certain sort." This is a motif that is found throughout Western Literature, that those who act selfishly or in an evil or morally decrepit manner become selfish, evil, or morally decrepit. Thus, an act is virtuous when the act is preformed knowingly, done for the sake of the virtue in itself, and done with a true and powerful will and belief behind the virtue of the action.

Pre-Aristolte

I believe that if there is a single goal that all humans are intent on achieving, it is the will to live a justified life, that is, a life that one can be proud of and satisfied with when they die. If this was not the goal of an individual human, then that human would undoubtedly commit suicide because they will have come to the conclusion that life cannot be justified and is therefore not worth living. As Albert Camus wrote, "The greatest philospical question is suicide, all others stem from whether or not life is worth living." What, and the way in which, one defines as "justified" is a different thing unto itself. Because this definition varies from person to person, we can see why there are many different ethical systems that different people adhere to. For me to propose an ethical system that will allow people to live a justified life, therefore, is folly - it is ridiculous, because I don't know what each individual perceives a justification for living. Allow me to make this more clear. It is my belief the intrinsic metaphysical facts of existence do not allow for there to be a universal ethical stance. To quote a line from Stephen Crane:

A man said to the universe: "Sir I exist!"
"However," replied the universe,
"The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation."

This is what I have found, that in their search for justification people look beyond themselves, for a higher power, a higher order or sense of being, in order to give themselves something to live for. To the Christian, the Muslim world-view is absurd, to the Muslim, the Hindu world view is absurd, to the Hindu the Jewish world view is absurd. Religion, and ethical systems based on the metaphysical, all claim to portray the correct way to live. People adhere to these systems because they cannot find justification by themselves, since the basic facts of existence create a sense of indifference. The ONLY way to justify a faith in one of these religious or metaphysically based systems is through Kierkegaardian "leap of faith". It is clear that there is no "proof" that the Jew is correct and the Muslim wrong, or the Christian is correct and the Hindu wrong, etc. If there were, then the whole world would adhere to that belief. Thus, a leap must be mad, but a leap to which religion? The answer is unclear.

Moving on to non-metaphysical based ethical systems, or what I will call "logic based ethical systems", there is no uniformity here either. There are, it appears, to contrasting theories, Utilitarianism, which believes that all decisions should be based on the amount of pleasure (hedons) or pain (dolers) it causes, thus one must be conscious of how one's decisions affect others at all times. The other extreme is Callicles style Ethical Egoism, which states that it is the natural order for the strong to rule over the weak, and that if everyone acting in their own rational self interest, the world would progress better. Which will provide a person a justification for living? Again, I cannot say, that is not my privilege. Both appear to be logical, both have strong arguments for and against them. It is a personal choice, and, indeed, responsibility to choose and defend ones own ethical position, regardless of the details. That, I can conclude, is what MY ethical belief is. It is this:

That every human acknowledge that he/she must justify his/her existence for his/her self, and the means, or ethical system he/she uses to do this is a personal choice that he/she must be prepared to defend, even if it is indefensible, for no other reason than that it justifies his/her life.

Gorgias II

Callicles takes the position opposite of Socrates and Polus, namely that doing wrong unto others is contemptible. Callicles believes that it is only natural for the strong to rule over the weak, for the powerful to dominate over those without power. He believes that weak and underlings in society always try to take advantage of those in power for a redistribution of resources, which they aren’t strong enough to get for themselves. He claims that, “It’s the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rulers. In making these rulers, they look after themselves and their own self interest, and that’s also the criterion they use when they dispense praise and criticism.” In other words, Callicles claims that the majority of the human race are leaches, intent on mooching off the work of others. He claims these people to be upsetting the “natural law.” His cynicism extents even towards philosophers, when he claims, “In actual fact, philosophers don’t understand the legal system, or know how to address either political or private meetings, or what kinds of things people enjoy or desire.” Thus, he expresses a belief that philosophy is an impractical art form, something lofty and out of touch with reality. In his opinion, it is power that one should be concerned with, not abstract ideals and theories. He sees every individual’s duty, not to be concerned with morality, but with advancing in society and increasing one’s lot in life.

Socrates, of course, attacks these premises and whittles away at Callicles argument. Slowly he makes Callicles retract at least some parts of his argument. By the time he claims “The main question I want to ask is whether or not a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness.” Socrates here drives home the point that if all we did was keep trying to give into our wants and desires, which never cease, we can never achieve happiness. It becomes a vicious, endless circle, which never satisfies us, and always leaves us despairing and longing for more. “It is power that leads men to plumb to the depths of depravity,” He declares. Socrates goes on to reinstate his belief that it is better to be harmed than to harm and links this with Callicles argument that Socrates would end up dead, and unable to defend himself before the courts. “He has all the protection he needs if he’s never wronged a fellow human being or god in anything he’s said or done,” Socrates states when Callicles asks him about a fellow member of the community being unable to defend himself. Truly, he is speaking of himself, and of all men, or of how all men ought to be. Indeed, Socrates declares himself to be “The only statesman in all of Athens” because the politicians don’t truly care about making people morally better, just lust for power, thus, they are failures.

It is clear here that Plato aligns himself with Socrates. Plato, like Socrates, had a disdain for democratic politicians, and devoted his life to writing about “the republic” where a Socrates-esque philosopher-king would rule the populace and oversee the moral advancement of his people, and then created The Academy to find this person. In addition, Socrates hints numerous times at “The good” and the inherent, perfect forms of objects, or feelings. This clearly supports Plato’s ethical and ontological beliefs that there are specific forms that things take, all stemming from the universal Good.

Gorgias

Gorgias most potently reveals his thoughts on the nature of rhetoric on page 19 – 20, when he declares: “Think of a community – any community you like- and I assure you that if an expert in rhetoric and a doctor went there and had to compete against each other for election as that community’s doctor by addressing the Assembly, or some other public meeting, the doctor would be left standing, and the effective speaker would win the election, if that is what he wanted … It’s inconceivable that a professional of any stamp could speak more persuasively in front of a crowd than a rhetorian on any topic at all.”

What Gorgias has revealed here about his profession is that it is nothing more that the art of presumption, of dolling up, of deception. Gorgias is no different than a con artist, or a telephone salesman. While rhetoric may very well be an art form, it is an art form only in relation to other art forms. In other words, if there were no doctors, being able to speak and act like a doctor holds no value. Gorgias is not judged on his skills in reality, but on his skills to sell his skills, regardless of whether or not those skills exist. He believes that this is true power, the ability to make people feel, and connect, and understand, and believe what he is saying, even if what he is saying is false or wrong. To Gorgias, that is what makes rhetoric such a powerful tool. To Socrates, however, it is nothing more than an empty pseudoscience, void of any real power or ability.

“By in front of a crowd, you meant in front of non-experts, didn’t you? I mean a rhetorian wouldn’t be more persuasive in front of an audience of experts, of course. (23)” Socrates poises this question to Gorgias, who has no choice but to agree. In this short beginning of this passage, Socrates has already defeated Gorgias’ main argument. He has called Gorgias’ bluff – that the rhetorian doesn’t have a profession to himself, he merely appears to be in a state of knowing and power. The person who uses his persuasive power foolishly and ends up making empty, false arguments is just a chatterbox. Truth, and the search for truth, is a much higher goal than trying to abuse, or manipulate truth.

Polus takes up Gorgias cause and brings it a step further, in his argument over whether or not it is just to harm another person, or to be harmed. Polus argues on page 49 that it is less desirable to have a wrong committed to him, but that it is more desirable to commit a wrong to someone else than to be punished. “Which do you think is worse, doing wrong, or having wrong done to you?” “Doing wrong” “Well isn’t it worse, given that it is more contemptible?” “Certainly not.” Here, we see that Polus is representing a form of ethical egoism, that whatever advances his position is the correct course of action. Socrates counters this by claiming a sort of “natural balance”. Just as good things are more admirable, so too is performing a good deed to someone else. It becomes apparent, to Socrates, that just as a doctor aids the physically ailed body, the Judge aids the morally decrepit mind. He points out that happiness is a journey – people don’t perform an action out of happiness, but rather to achieve happiness.

“Now, imagine two people both of whom are physically or psychologically in a bad state. One of them is receiving treatment and is being freed from his badness, while the other isn’t, and so still has it. Which of these two people is worse off?” Socrates uses this example to prove his point that being punished is in the best interest of the criminal. My objection to this line of thought is that medical treatment is natural, and objective. Punishment is subject to laws of men, which are not universal or based on morals or psychology.

Prior to Plato

It is of the utmost importance, in the terms laid out, to avoid being harmed, rather than to avoid causing harm to another person. One cannot EVER not harm another person, because one has no perception of how the other person will relate to the "harm" being preformed. For example, suppose I steal 1000 dollars from another person. Now, let us assume that said person is a millionaire, and doesn't keep track of his money. Have I caused him "harm"? I would argue that ignorance of a crime negates the crime itself. One must be aware, firstly, of a harmful action in order for it to constitute as a crime. Those seeking to be ethical, and to be treated as ethical, must live in the present, in the "real" world, not in the capacity of lofty and abstract ideals. Let us now assume that I am angered at my friend and throw a wild punch at him. Let us now assume that my friend is drunk, thus, he doesn't feel the punch. In fact, in his drunken state, he laughs at me, despite the fact that he is bruised. Has he been harmed? Again, I cannot know how he will feel tomorrow - I have no control over his perceptions. Thus, why should I concern myself with pleasing these abstract, unknowable whims of the "Other". I denote the Other as anything that is not myself, that is, anything that I do not have conscious control over. To live at the whim of the Other, whim by definition cannot be known, is to risk living fully for oneself. The first priority of every rational human should be to protect himself from harm (as he perceives it) not to protect others from harm (as he perceives that they perceive it). Guilt, getting caught, all these things, these dependencies upon which the original action may result, are subjective to the individual. Subjective values, such as the value one places on not feeling guilty, are again beyond my control. All I can concern myself with is my reaction to this feeling of guilt, and to an extent, the value I place on my reaction towards choosing actions that avoid or enhance this feeling.

Therefore, the above points considered, we must place the higher emphasis on the skills to discern whether or not our beliefs are true or false, rather than the skills to persuade others without beliefs. The beliefs of others, again, are subjective. What concern is it of mine the beliefs that others hold, so long as my number one priority is to avoid harm? If I cannot be harmed, and this is my goal, am I not free to discern my own beliefs? I do not leave myself at the whims of others, nor do I attempt to control or influence the beliefs of others - I am a content, complete human. The weak, spineless, and personally unstable are those who try to conform others to their beliefs. As Soren Kierkegaard beautifully put it, "The door to happiness opens outward -- he who tries to push his way in will not be able to enter." Let us look inward, through reflection and mediation, at OUR beliefs, before we dare to attack, change, or influence the beliefs of others. There is no doubt that Kierkegaard would support this claim. To be concerned with the beliefs and opinions of others is to risk losing that which one believes himself. Again, let us examine the Church. Dante places 7 Popes in Hell. These Holy men, these Papal dignitaries, this Vicars of Christ, are men who, in order to spread "The world of God" condoned the murder of thousands, and the abuse of thousands more. It cannot logically be argued based on the historical teachings left behind by Jesus that he would have approved of such things a the Crusades, the Inquisition, the selling of indulgences, the polygamy of the Popes, and yet they preformed these actions in his name. They lost sight of the great ideals they held, the morals they championed, and lost themselves in the process, and, at least according to Dante, earned a spot in Hell.

Preliminary Views on Ethical Systems

“The world itself is the will to power - and nothing else! And you yourself are the will to power - and nothing else!” Friedrich Nietzsche

With regard to what makes a decision ethical, with how ethical statements are perceived, and the power that ethics have in society, it quickly becomes clear that there is no “standard” from culture to culture, or society to society. While all societies share some beliefs, there are many more which are not shared. The human sacrifices of the Aztecs stand in direct contradiction to the western view that life is sacred. The Buddhist conception that selflessness and leading a life free of suffering is primary is contrasted with western emphasis on individualism and capitalism. It therefore becomes of the utmost necessity to ask, “Why is something ethical? What are ethics and how do they relate to the larger picture?”

It becomes clear, not at first, but after careful study, that ethics are always determined by the powerful. An “Ethical System” is simply a means employed by those in power to impose their will over the populace. Via this system, the powerful can integrate their will over the beliefs, lifestyles, and perceptions of the masses. The greatest example of this is the Roman Catholic Church. The basis of the theology of the church is of little concern – the fact is that in order to spread their theological ethics, the Church condoned the murder of hundreds of thousands of infidels in Spain, the persecution of the Jews and Muslims in their homelands, and the colonization of indigenous peoples in the name of these beliefs. The Church could not be challenged, because the church had consolidated all the power. Power and Ethics are in separable. Looking to the Protestant reformation, we see that it was only a success because by converting, German Princes, French Nobles, and British Kings could free themselves from the chains of the Church. Hence, the Church lost power. Those who stayed faithful to the church did so to keep power – Spain was given Papal Authority to rule the entire New World. Of course, had the Church of been weaker, and perhaps the Islamic nations stronger or more centralized, there is no doubt that Europe would have become Muslim. Instead, Europe and America are today “Christian” and these Christian values are so ingrained in our society that it is hard to imagine a non-Christian America.

To take a contemporary example, let us considered the war in Iraq. It is common knowledge that President Bush long felt that it was America’s ethical duty to bring democracy to the Middle East, and that war was the only way to achieve that end. Other high level Cabinet Officials, including Colin Powell, disagreed. President Bush, however, was able to charge into war, because he, as President, had the power to do so. 80% of Americans supported him at the time. That is the power that power has over the ethical beliefs of the masses.

It would seem that people learn, or pick up, at least when they are young, a good number of there beliefs from society. I am a Lockean in this regard - knowledge is obtained simply by viewing and absorbing the repitive nature of events and objects. As a child, I am told that this object with four wooden legs and a flat surface is a table. I then form a preliminary idea of a "table". As I see other tables, and am told more about tables, my preliminary idea begins to change to account for these other tables. Soon, it encompasses nothing more an a definition of the word table - an obeject with 4 legs and a flat surface. I now have my "ideal form" of the table. It is the same with ethics. Through repitition and the careful indocrination of"right" and "wrong", young children in today's society learn the same about ethics. It begins at birth and continues throught primary school - "treat others how you would like to be treated" "learn to share" "work together" "act kind", etc. This is not to say that these are bad lessons, merely thatmany people accept them as a true without reflection. As they come from Authority, they cannot be taken as absolutely true - Authority begs to be questioned, to simply accept everything one hears as true as correct is to lend oneself to ignorance, no matter what the discipline.

Throughout the history of humanity, those in power have enforced the ethical beliefs they support across the world. Regardless of the nature or origins of these beliefs, the sole commonality is that they broaden the base of power of those who support them. Ethics are the cynic’s dearest toolkit. With ethics on his side, any man can control his brothers.

First Post

This is my first post. I've create this blog for my ethics class. Regarding the ethical, I have no specific philosophy or theory that I hold close to my reasoning. I find Religio-Theological ethics too exclusive, Kantionian ethics too impratical, Hume's ethical theory is okay, but simplistic, Utilitarianism is too complex to apply as a blanket, and Ethical Egoism, while connvincing, is a bit unusual to be considered "ethical". So I look forward to learning more about this theories and others over the course of the next few weeks.