Doubt 2

When I reread the play, I actually found myself admiring Sister Aloysius more than I did the first time. There is a lot, I think, that is admirable in the way in which her strict, harshness is grounded in what can only be called morally necessity. She has chosen to walk down a path of isolation in pursuit of helping others, albeit unusually, but also in a more productive manner, and in doing so, is promoting the greater good, which I suppose would make her a utilitarian. By putting aside her own desires, she can better bring about utility in others. That's my impression. For me, this second reading has given me a better insight into the different ways in which people view the job of a moral cultivator. By that, I mean that in my first reading, I despised Sister Aloysius for similar reasons that I admire her this time. I had to look past my own prejudices about what a "moral person" is in order to really understand what this person was trying to do.

ASIDE: I understand what Professor McCrickerd was saying earlier in class today about a teacher not being a friend, but rather someone that students should be slightly distanced from and should look up to as an example. I pretty much agree with that, but upon thinking it over, I think that there is more to that teachers have to offer. The teacher, I feel, should be mentor. Where would Heidegger be without Husserl? Wittgenstein without Russell? In order to be a mentor, you have to be that person's friend. That doesn't mean you have to go out drinking or partying with them, but it does mean that there needs to be a positive relationship that both parties feel is beneficial in some way. I believe it was Aristotle, maybe Plato, who had differing degrees of friendship. At one stage, there's the friend who advises the other, and one who receives the advise, but it's not in dogmatic way, rather a comfortable, productive manner. Anyway, that's just my thoughts.

Doubt

Doubt was a powerful play to read. It struck me several times as I was reading it hard. Father Flynn's speech at the beginning of the play was very Existential, I thought. It was something I could easily have pictured reading in Kierkegaard. The over all theme of the play, was not, as I thought it would be, so much about faith in God as it was in faith in other people. Sister Aloysius, was a fantastic character. She represented two things to me at the beginning of the play. First, she was a manifestation of the kind of self-righteous, completely hypocritical Christian that I do not care for. On the other hand, I admired her detachment and stern conviction. Insofar as her view was diametrically opposed to Father Flynn's, and yet Father Flynn was clearly an immoral person, while her outlook was more dogmatic, and yet she, in the end was morally vindicated, made an interesting drama. For Sister Aloysius, those who have undertaken holy orders are above the ministry, and should serve as role models, if not idols. Fr. Flynn, however, argues that Priests should serve the ministry, rather than act so high and mighty. This is of the utmost importance because it leads the readers to sympathize with Fr. Flynn perspective, even though he was in the wrong, and even though Sr. Aloysius still cared about the people in the ministry.

Now, based on a Kantian approach to morality, Sister Aloysius was immoral, because she lied in order to get the end result. This would, most likely, violate the Categorical Imperative as it would be irrational that everyone would lie if they wanted information from another person verified. For Mill, too, while her aim was noble, the end result is highly likely to cause more pain than pleasure, again, making the consequence of the act immoral. I think that realizing this is what caused Sister Aloysius to break down at the of the play - it was too much to handle and she had no options.

I'm not sure who I most admire. Sister James was far too passive and easily manipulated to be admirable. Sister Aloysius' Stern conviction is admirable, but the means by which she accomplishes her goal is very Machiavellian and, were she willing to defend that philosophy, would be admirable, but seeing as she is distraught by taking those actions she cannot be admirable. Fr. Flynn, were he innocent, would have been admirable, but in guilt, becomes a despicable hypocrite. Ms. Muller had conviction, was genuinely looking out for her son's best interests and in the end, she was correct, because Sr. Aloysius did end up creating more harm than good, and Fr. Flynn ended up being rewarded. Therefore, for her conviction, sense of justice, and down to earth approach to the situation, I name Ms. Muller the Most Admirable.

I don't know who of the above to sympathize with. Much for the same reasons they are not admirable, I have no sympathy for them. So I supposed I'd be most sympathetic towards the kid, Thomas.

The way in which the author structured the play around truth, lack of clarity, and connections that one had to make for himself, he pretty well situated the ambiguous and cloudy nature of discerning truth claims in the real world.

ROK4

The other day in my resident hall, a group of students approached me in the froyer to ask if I wanted to help them make cards for soliders oversees. I was busy, and didn't know anyone in the group, nor did I really want to. Thus, I said No thanks and walked away. Later that day, however, as I was coming back from class, I saw them again, and, this time, my motives still unchanged, sat down and helped them out. It was good times.

ROK3

Sunday is recycling day in my hall. One of the hardest things about recycling, especially in GK, is the crazy amount of stuff that the EC's have to go around and pick up. The other day, I noticed as I came back that some one's bag broke and spilled garbage everywhere. Thus, I stopped and helped them pick up the trash for about 15 minutes until it was all done.

Mill and Social Situations

What struck me about this chapter was how much emphasis Mill puts on Social things in general. Social duties, social obligations, social utility, etc. My point is he puts a lot thought into the idea of humanity as a social collection of beings, so to speak. Now this really drives Mill's entire philosophy. This is evident from his conception of justice. For Mill, I believe, one of the main arguments against Utilitarianism is the idea of justice and injustice. How can, if society is driven by the idea of the greater good, injustice laws arise? Mill's view, again, on Justice is that it is a set of moral requirements that promote social utility, thus making it of the most important degree. This explains, for Mill, how the idea or conception of Justice changes from time to time and society to society - because man, being a social creature, must adapt his responses to moral situations depending on the level of utility involved. He uses the example of Hammurabi's code to illustrate this, and how, even if said code isn't used any more, most people feel a twinge of yearning for that kind of justice still. This is, for Mill, a natural, rather than a social, response.

Utility and such

My understanding of Utilitarianism is thus: That a decision is moral if the outcome of that decision creates a greater amount of good than it does evil. This can be applied to small as well as large scale situations. What I am still a bit confused about is too whether or not Mill believes that this is something that rational people will just naturally do, or if it is the course of action we should, rather than always do, take. For example, if we always put the idea of the "Greater Happiness" theory to work, everyone would a vegan. Mill, and most contemporary Utilitarians I know of, were animal rights activists.

To Mill, it matters very little whether from an epistemological standpoint a person is an emphirist or a rationalist, believes in a priori principles or learning through experience. The fact of the matter is, according Mill, is that ALL ethical theories have one thing in common - the ultimate goal is happiness. Thus, he doesn't feel that he needs to provide a much further proof, than that all other theories revolve around the notion of happiness. He has simply forged from that a more comprehensive, sensible, from his perspective, theory. He believes that certain things are simply desirable - if one desires money, he will work within the context of the socio-economic structure to earn that money. Likewise, if one desires to create happiness, he will work within the context of an ethical system (Utilitarianism) that creates the most happiness.

Mill Prep

It would certainly seem that the act of causing pain would be considered immoral, and that causing happiness would be considered moral. There are critics of this idea however, Kierkegaard said something along the lines of, "The pursuit of Pleasure or Pain? Is not that what motivates a slug?" So while innately acting in a manner that produces pleasure can be viewed as good, and a manner that decreases pain is also good, I don't see a fundamental argument that can be made from a metaphysical perspective (like Kant) in favor of this form of ethics. If one is to argue that the action that has the most positive consequences is best, I would have to ask, best for whom? Aren't consequences nearly always subjective (or at least how one views consquences)?